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Abstract
We study black-box adversarial attacks for image classifiers
in a constrained threat model, where adversaries can only
modify a small fraction of pixels in the form of scratches on an
image. We show that it is possible for adversaries to generate
localized adversarial scratches that cover less than 5% of
the pixels in an image and achieve targeted success rates
of 98.77% and 97.20% on ImageNet and CIFAR-10 trained
ResNet-50 models, respectively. We demonstrate that our
scratches are effective under diverse shapes, such as straight
lines or parabolic Bézier curves, with single or multiple colors.
In an extreme condition, in which our scratches are a single
color, we obtain a targeted attack success rate of 66% on
CIFAR-10 with an order of magnitude fewer queries than
comparable attacks. We successfully launch our attack against
Microsoft’s Cognitive Services Image Captioning API and
propose various mitigation strategies.
1 Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved state-of-the-
art results in image classification [24, 25, 29, 45, 47], ma-
chine translation [16, 17, 38], and reinforcement learning
tasks [6, 43, 44, 50], and have been adopted for a wide ar-
ray of tasks, such as cancer detection [1, 41], malware detec-
tion [30, 39, 49], speech recognition [22], and more. How-
ever, despite these accomplishments, DNNs are surprisingly
susceptible to deception by adversarial samples [48], which
consist of images containing sub-perceptual noise, invisible
to humans, that can lead a neural network to misclassify a
given input. The adversarial samples can be: (1) targeted
(i.e., the goal is to make the model classify the samples to
an adversarially desired outcome), or (2) untargeted (i.e., the
misclassification can be attributed to any class that is not the
ground truth). Researchers have demonstrated that adversar-
ial samples that transfer to the real-world can be printed on
∗Work done when the author was a Visiting Graduate Student at Univer-
sity of California San Diego
(a) Original Image. (b) Adversarial Image
Figure 1: Adversarial attack on Microsoft’s Cognitive Ser-
vices Image Captioning API. Generated caption for Image 1a:
‘a large passenger jet flying through a cloudy blue sky’. Gen-
erated caption for Image 1b: ‘a group of people flying kites in
the sky’. Best viewed in color.1
paper or 3D-models [5], and can target classifiers in different
domains, such as images [48], speech [12], and text [3].
The majority of existing adversarial sample-generation tech-
niques for image classifiers focuses on invisible perturbations
that often cover the entire image, where the maximum per-
turbation added to the image is upper bounded according to
an Lp-norm metric. These include the L0 norm [37], which
captures the number of perturbed image pixels; the L1 [13,35]
norm, which measures the Manhattan norm or absolute sum of
perturbation values; the L2 norm [10], which measures the Eu-
clidean distance of the perturbation; or the L∞ norm [19, 31],
which is the largest perturbed value.
In most of these threat models, the adversary has white-box
access to the model parameters, i.e., the adversary has full
knowledge of the model parameters and training data. Con-
sequently, in these cases, the adversary can easily calculate
gradients with respect to the inputs. While these attacks ex-
emplify the significant risks to which neural networks might
be exposed, they often do not reflect a realistic threat scenario
against computer vision models deployed in the real world,
which is often a black-box scenario, where adversaries have
1An anonymized video demonstration of the attack can be found
here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WminC14RLeY
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limited queries and no access to the model architecture or
parameters.
This paper proposes a new parametric L0 black-box adver-
sarial attack against machine learning (ML) models for this
limited, but realistic threat scenario. In the threat model, the
adversary can only modify pixels in a constrained manner.
We call these modifications adversarial scratches, inspired by
the scratches commonly found in actual printed images. Our
scratches are parametrized as simple geometric shapes: line
segments or second-degree Bézier curves, which are evolved
through Evolution Strategies, as highlighted in Figure 2. We
furthermore enforce a query budget to simulate rate limiting
for real-world ML systems.
We propose two novel evolutionary black-box neural net-
work attacks, for which the only available information is the
confidence for an image caption or for individual class labels.
1.1 Contributions
• Adversarial scratches, a new class of constrained black-
box attacks for image classifiers. Adversarial scratches
leverage Evolution Strategies, where scratches are
evolved parametrically according to a pre-defined fitness
function, and can successfully attack ResNet-50, VGG-
19, and AlexNet architectures trained on the CIFAR-10
and ImageNet datasets.
• Attack effectiveness evaluation across a variety of attack
parameters, including query dependence, scratch shape,
scratch location, and scratch color. Even in the extremely
constrained case with a single color for a single scratch,
our attacks achieved a 66% targeted success rate for
CIFAR-10 trained neural networks.
• Successful attack deployments in both image and net-
work domains, similar to LaVAN work by Karmon et
al. [27]. The image-domain scratches are restricted to
lie within the normal dynamic image range of [0,1]; the
network-domain scratches are not necessarily restricted
on predefined bounds.
• A real-world attack against Microsoft’s commercially
available Cognitive Services Image Captioning API.
Our attacks successfully fooled the API into produc-
ing wrong captions or no captions (an example of a
successful attack is demonstrated in Figure 1), thereby
demonstrating a real-world manifestation of an adversar-
ial attack on ML systems. We have contacted Microsoft
regarding this vulnerability.
• Countermeasures to our attacks. We propose, evaluate,
and discuss different countermeasures to our attacks in-
cluding, JPEG compression, median filtering, and image
clipping, and we assess their effectiveness in mitigating
the effect of adversarial scratches and their impact on
benign images.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
discuss related work and provide the necessary background
information. Section 3 discusses the methodology pursued
to generate adversarial scratches. Section 4 and Section 5
depict our experimental setting and our results, respectively.
In Section 6, we further elaborate on our results, initial failed
attempts, and potential defense strategies. We provide our
conclusions and future directions in Section 7.
2 Background and Related Work
There is extensive prior work on generating adversarial sam-
ples for neural networks across multiple input domains. We
highlight the different types of adversarial attacks on neu-
ral networks and provide a quick overview of the evolution
strategies used in our work.
2.1 Adversarial Attacks on Neural Networks
Prior works on adversarial attacks on neural networks consist
of methods to deceive [4,10,19,37] or cause denial-of-service
of neural networks [42]. Our work considers adversarial at-
tacks that attempt to deceive image classifiers. We consider a
neural network f (·) used for classification where f (x)i repre-
sents the softmax probability that image x corresponds to class
i. Images are represented as x∈ [0,1]w.h.c, where w,h,c are the
width, height, and number of channels of the image. We de-
note the classification of the network as C(x) = argmaxi f (x)i,
with C∗(x) representing the ground truth of the image. Given
an image x and an adversarial sample x′, the adversarial sam-
ple has the following properties:
• L(x′− x) is small for some image distance metric L.
• C(x′) 6=C∗(x) =C(x). This means that the prediction on
the adversarial sample is incorrect whereas the original
prediction is correct.
Biggio et al. [8] were the first to show the occurrence
of adversarial examples in Support Vector Machines, while
Szegedy et al. [48] discovered that deep neural networks are
prone to such attacks as well. Since then, there has been a
plethora of works generating adversarial samples for both
white and black-box scenarios.
White-Box Adversarial Attacks. In the white-box threat sce-
nario, adversaries have full access to the neural network pa-
rameters and can calculate gradients with respect to inputs.
Most white-box adversarial sample attacks characterize ro-
bustness with respect to the Lp norm, as outlined below.
• L0-norm attacks limit the number of perturbed pixels.
Several examples include the JSMA attack [37], which
finds vulnerable pixels through saliency maps for inputs,
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Input	image Genetic	solver Generated	adversarial	scratches Target	neural	network
(black-box	access)
Fitness	function Predictions
Figure 2: Framework to generate variable location adversarial scratches. Scratch parameters include: (1) number of scratches, (2)
domain of scratches (image or network domain), (3) location parameters of scratch (fixed or variable), (4) population size, (5)
number of iterations, (6) mutation and crossover rate. Best viewed in color.
(a) Original Image. (b) 1 straight-line scratch (c) 2 straight-line scratches
(d) 1-Bézier curve scratch (e) 2-Bézier curve scratches (f) 3-Bézier curve scratches
Figure 3: Adversarial Scratches can have diverse manifestations, such as Bézier Curves or Straight Lines. Individual scratches
for the same image may have different colors. Best viewed in color.
SparseFool [34], which exploits the low mean curva-
ture of decision boundaries, and [36], which uses greedy
search to find adversarial perturbations.
• L1-norm attacks place an upper bound on the Manhattan
distance or absolute sum of perturbation values. Exam-
ples include DeepFool [35] and the EAD attack [40].
• L2-norm attacks place an upper bound on the Euclidean
distance of the adversarial perturbation. A notable exam-
ple is the Carlini-Wagner L2 [11] attack, which performs
gradient descent on the predicted perturbation norm.
• L∞-norm attacks place an upper bound on the maximum
perturbation that can be applied to each pixel. Notable
examples include the Fast Gradient Sign Method [19]
and the Projected Gradient Descent method [31].
In addition to Lp-norm constrained attacks, several other
attacks use gradient information, such as LaVAN [27] and
adversarial patches [9].
Black-box Adversarial Attacks. In the black-box threat sce-
narios adversaries possess limited information of the parame-
ters of the neural network under attack. This threat model may
range from adversaries having access to the full prediction
vector, i.e., soft-label, to simply having access to the top pre-
dicted label, i.e., hard-label. Black-box attacks are generally
more challenging to implement than their white-box counter-
parts due to limited information available to the adversary.
Recent literature has proposed numerous black-box attacks
that restrict perturbations with respect to an L2 or L∞ norm
constraint. Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan [36] use a naive
policy of perturbing random segments of an image to gener-
ate adversarial examples. Bhagoji et al. [7] reduce the feature
space dimensions using PCA and random feature grouping
before estimating gradients. Chen et al. [14] use finite differ-
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ences to estimate gradients for a gradient based-attack. Ilyas
et al. [26] use Natural Evolutionary Strategies to estimate
gradients, while GenAttack [2] uses genetic algorithms to
estimate gradients. Guo et al. [20] identify that low-frequency
perturbations allow for improved query efficiency for black-
box attacks, which is further evaluated in SimBA [21].
In contrast to these works, L0-norm bounded black-box
attacks are rarely explored. The One-Pixel Attack [46] uses
Differential Evolution to find the optimal (x,y) pixel coor-
dinates and RGB values, but it has a poor success rate on
larger neural networks and requires several thousand queries.
The PatchAttack [51] method uses reinforcement learning to
optimally place pre-generated textured patches, however, the
patches are often very large and highly visible, covering up
to 20% of the entire image. The Adversarial scratches dis-
cussed in our work use Differential Evolution, similar to the
One-Pixel Attack, but proposes a parametric model for the
perturbation which vastly reduces the number of search pa-
rameters. Finally, our approach implements a physical attack
on a real-world image classification framework.
2.2 Evolution Strategies
The generation of adversarial scratches uses evolution strate-
gies, which are population-based gradient-free optimization
strategies. They are roughly inspired by the process of natural
selection, in which a population P of candidate solutions is
generated at each iteration, termed a generation. Candidate
solutions are evaluated using a fitness function, and "fitter"
solutions are more likely to be selected to breed the next gener-
ation of solutions. The whole process terminates either when a
candidate solution satisfies some pre-defined criteria, or when
the maximum number of generations is reached. The next
generation is generated through a combination of crossover
and mutation. Crossover involves taking numerous parent
solutions, combining their parameters, and generating a new
generation of solutions, similar to biological reproduction.
Mutation applies small random perturbations to population
members to increase the diversity of population members and
provide a better exploration of the search space. Evolution
strategies are particularly suited for black-box optimization,
as they do not require any information about the underlying
fitness function. Our work uses the Differential Evolution
(DE) and Covariance-Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategies
(CMA-ES) algorithms.
Differential Evolution. Differential Evolution is an evolu-
tion strategy that allows for constrained optimization of al-
gorithm parameters within a certain bound. This is highly
advantageous for generating adversarial scratches for real-
world scenarios where perturbations are restricted to be in the
dynamic range of images. Algorithm 1 highlights the steps to
generate potential candidates for a given set of parameters to
the Differential Evolution solver.
CMA-ES. Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy
Algorithm 1: Differential Evolution for a fitness function
F , which draws the adversarial scratch and evaluates the
model performance on the scratched image. The algorithm
parameters are population size λ, number of iterations N,
mutation rate m, cross-over rate CR, and bounds for each
candidate solution BOUNDS. It returns candidate x ∈ Rn,
where n is the size of the solution vector being evaluated.
Require: F , λ, N, m, CR, BOUNDS
X ← uni f orm_random_generator(λ,n, [0,1])
for i = 1 to N do
for j = 1 to λ do
x = X j
p,q,r← random_sample(3,n)s.t p 6= q 6= r
a,b,c← X [p,q,r]
MUTANT = clip(a+m× (b− c),BOUNDS)
r = uni f orm_random_generator(n, [0,1])
for k = 1 to n do
if rk ≤CR then
yk = MUTANT [k]
else
yk = x[k]
end if
end for
if F(y)≤ F(x) then
X j = y
end if
end for
end for
return x ∈ X such that F(x)< F(xk) ∀ k ∈ {1,2...N}
(CMA-ES) is an evolution strategy used for the optimization
of real non-convex functions in a continuous domain and
it is considered a state-of-the-art algorithm in evolutionary
computation [23]. At each generation, CMA-ES samples a
population of candidate solutions from a multivariate normal
distribution, whose mean, standard deviation, and covariance
matrix are updated after each iteration. The covariance ma-
trix is used to track pair-wise dependencies of the optimized
parameters; this allows the solver to dynamically change the
degree of exploration during the optimization process. Al-
gorithm 2 shows how CMA-ES works on a high level, with
covariance matrix C, and evolution paths pc and pσ. For fur-
ther details on its implementation, please refer to the CMA-ES
author’s tutorial [23].
3 Methodology
In this section we frame the generation of adversarial
scratches as a constrained-optimization problem. We high-
light the parameters used to generate scratches as well as
characterize scratch generation techniques depending on the
dynamic range of images.
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Algorithm 2: Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution
Strategy for a fitness function F . The algorithm parame-
ters are population size λ, number of iterations N, mean
vector µ ∈ Rn, and step size σk, where n is the size of
the solution vector being evaluated. It returns candidate
x1 ∈ Rn or µ
Require: F , λ, N, µ, σk
{Initialize variables}
C = I, pσ = 0, pc = 0
for i = 1 to N do
{Generate new population}
for j = 1 to λ do
x j = sample_ f rom_N(µ, σ2C)
f j = F(x j)
end for
{Sort best candidates and update all parameters}
x1...λ = xs(1)...s(λ) with s(i) = argsort( f1...λ, j)
µ′ = µ
µ← update_means(x1, ...,xn)
pσ = update_ps(psigma,σ−1C−1/2(µ−µ′)
pc = update_pc(pc,σ−1(µ−µ′),‖|pσ‖|)
C = update_c(C, pc,(x1−µ′)/σ, ...,(xλ−µ′)/σ)
σ= update_sigma(σ, ||pσ||)
end for
return x1 or µ
3.1 Problem Description
Formally, we consider an image classifier f represented as
f : [0,1]w.h.c → RK where K is defined as the number of
classes. f (x)i represents the softmax probability that input x
corresponds to class i. Images are represented as x∈ [0,1]w.h.c,
where w,h,c are the width, height, and number of channels
of the image. The goal of the adversary is to produce an
adversarial sample x′ ∈ [0,1]w.h.c that satisfies the following
properties:
maximize f (x′)adversarial
subject to L(x′− x)≤ d
Here L(·) represents some distance metric for the adversar-
ial perturbation, which is often minimized or upper-bounded.
Prior works often involved utilizing the Lp norm as the dis-
tance metric. In this vein, our work is most similar to L0-norm
bounded attacks.
3.2 Proposed Solution
We propose the first parametric black-box L0 attack where the
adversarial perturbations are added in the form of scratches
on an image. In particular a perturbation δ∈Rw.h.c is confined
over a small area of the image x defined by the support of the
scratch, the scratch mask m ∈ {0,1}w.h. Scratches are defined
as
x′ = (1−m) x+mδ, (1)
where  denotes the element-wise multiplication.
Scratches can be manifested either as Bézier curves [18] or
as line segments, and can consist of a single color for all pixels
belonging to a scratch or have distinct colors for each pixel.
Ours is the first attack to adopt a parametric model to define
the scratch mask m, which is key to reducing the number
of attack parameters. Adversarial scratches often look like
natural artifacts but can significantly affect the prediction of
neural networks. Parametric modeling of the scratches allows
for flexible attacks on an image.
Depending on the attack scenario, we choose to keep the
mask m fixed or to evolve its parameters via Differential
Evolution. We divide our attacks into two setups based on the
real-world feasibility of the attack, namely the image domain
and the network domain. In the image domain, the scratch
values are restricted to lie in the dynamic range of images;
that is, the pixel values of the adversarially scratched image
x′ values must lie in the range [0,1] for RGB images. We
initially attempted to keep the mask m fixed but found that
this method would often get stuck in local minima, following
which we chose to evolve m via Differential Evolution. The
network domain imposes no such restrictions on the scratches
and the adversarial scratch values can exceed the image range.
We generate image-domain scratches through Differential
Evolution due to its ability to specify input constraints such as
scratch location and pixel values. We obtain network-domain
scratches through the CMA-ES algorithm due to its ability
to find solutions effectively in an unconstrained search space
and through Differential Evolution by relaxing the constraints
on the dynamic range of pixel values.
3.3 Image-Domain Attack
In the image-domain attack, individual scratches are evolved
according to Differential Evolution. Our initial attempts to
generate scratches with fixed scratch locations were unsuc-
cessful. These experiments are described in-depth in Sec-
tion 6.
Each scratch in the image-domain can be represented as
line segment or as a second-order rational Bézier curve [52],
which is a parametric curve commonly used in computer
graphics and robotics. A Bézier curve uses 3 anchor points
P0 = (x0,y0), P1 = (x1,y1) and P2 = (x2,y2) with a weighting
coefficient W to draw a curve according to the following
equation:
B(t) =
(1− t)2P0+2(1− t)tWP1+ t2P2
(1− t)2+2(1− t)tW + t2 (2)
For image-domain attacks, the perturbation parameters are
encoded into an array, which is also termed the candidate
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Figure 4: Second-degree Bézier curve with anchor points and
weighting coefficient used to generate scratches.
solution. For single-scratch Bézier curve attacks, the candi-
date solution is a 10−dimensional vector consisting of the
following:
• (x0,y0),(x1,y1),(x2,y2) for P0,P1, and P2 respectively,
namely the x-y coordinates for the anchor points Each
(x,y) pair is constrained to be between [0,w], [0,h] so as
to be within the image dimensions.
• W , the weighting coefficient used to control the shape of
the curve. Constrained between [0,7].
• R,G,B consisting of the pixel values for each of the color
channels of the adversarial scratch δ. For image domains,
they are constrained between [0,1].
For line segments, the scratches are encoded as a
7−dimensional vector consisting of the following:
• (x0,y0),(x1,y1) for P0 and P1, the x-y coordinates for
the starting and ending points of the line segment. Each
(x,y) pair is constrained between [0,w], [0,c].
• R,G,B consisting of the pixel values for each of the
color channels of the adversarials scratch δ. For image
domains, they are constrained between [0,1].
Multiple scratches consist of copies of the same set of
variables encoded in the same array. For example, an array
for 2 Bézier curve scratches would be 20−dimensional, with
the first 10 devoted to the first scratch and the next 10 devoted
to the second scratch.
Fitness Function. We outline the algorithm to generate tar-
geted attacks as follows. Formally, let F : Rd → R be the
fitness function that must be minimized for differential evolu-
tion, with the image classifier f represented as f : [0,1]w.h.c→
RK . The fitness function takes in the candidate solution as a
vector of real numbers and produces a real number as output,
which indicates the fitness of the given candidate solution. A
reasonable expectation for the fitness function is to directly
use the target class softmax probability; however, we observed
that it is more efficient and effective to jointly minimize the
top class, while attempting to maximize the target class prob-
abilities, in addition to using their logarithms for numerical
stability. Specifically, for a target class t with source class
s, we maximize the following to steer the network output
towards class t:
F(x) = α× log( f (x)t)−β× log( f (x)s) , (3)
After performing a grid search, we observe that the pa-
rameters α= 1,β= 50 offer the best attack success rate. To
generate the adversarial sample x′, we used this fitness func-
tion in an iterative manner. This fitness function was then
used to evaluate candidates at each generation in Algorithm 1.
For untargeted attacks, we modify the fitness function as
follows:
F(x) =−
K
∑
i=0
f (x)i× log( f (x)i) (4)
as this would maximize the entropy of the classifier predic-
tions rather than the prediction on any particular class.
3.4 Network-Domain Attack
Network-domain attacks may be evolved according to Differ-
ential Evolution or CMA-ES, and may be further divided into
two types depending on whether the parameters that govern
the scratch locations are fixed or variable. Unlike fixed-scratch
attacks in the image domain, we were able to obtain success-
ful results for this setting. We explore two options that control
the locations for each scratch.
Fixed Scratch Location. In the network-domain at-
tack, scratches are either represented as a line segment
parametrized by starting and ending points P0 = (x0,y0) and
P1 = (x1,y1), or as a second-order Bézier curve with points
P0 = (x0,y0),P1 = (x1,y1), and P2 = (x2,y2) with a weighting
factor W , similar to the image-domain scenario. We randomly
choose a mask m that stays fixed throughout the attack, and
evolve the value of each pixel belonging in the scratch rather
than assigning a single color to each scratch as in the image-
domain attacks. Thus, for a scratch covering M pixels on a
RGB image, the adversarial scratch values can be written as a
vector with 3M elements. This leads to a much larger search
space for which we use the Covariance Matrix Adaptation
Evolutionary Strategy (CMA-ES). We settled upon CMA-ES
due to its ability to find solutions in larger and unconstrained
environments, which make it suitable for network-domain
attacks. We utilized the same fitness function used for the
Image Domain.
Variable Scratch Location. In the variable scratch location,
we repeated the experiments of the image-domain experiment,
but relaxed the constraint on the pixel value range, allowing
it to have any value, rather than being restricted to [0,1].
6
4 Experimental Setup
We describe the experimental setup for our scratches on the
ResNet-50 and VGG-16 neural networks trained on CIFAR-
10 and pre-trained ImageNet ResNet-50 and AlexNet net-
works, considering both image-domain and network-domain
attacks.
4.1 Image-Domain Setup
We trained ResNet-50 [24] and VGG-16 [45] models on
the CIFAR-10 [28] dataset and achieved test accuracies
of 93.91% and 85.77%, respectively. In addition to attack-
ing these models for CIFAR-10, we attacked ImageNet pre-
trained AlexNet [29] and ResNet-50 models. All attacks were
performed on correctly classified images.
For CIFAR-10 targeted attacks, we utilized the fitness func-
tion outlined in Equation 3. We observed that CIFAR-10 at-
tacks are most effective with a population size of 50, mutation
rate 0.8, 50 iterations, and cross-over rate 0.7. We observed
that targeted attacks on ImageNet trained models failed to con-
verge after several hundred iterations; hence, we proceeded
with the untargeted fitness function, outlined in Equation 4,
with a population size of 100 over 100 iterations, based on a
grid search on potential populations and iterations. All CIFAR-
10 experiments were conducted on 1000 test-set images, and
ImageNet experiments were conducted on 100 validation set
images.
4.2 Network Domain Setup
Fixed Scratch Location. We conducted our network-domain
experiments on the ResNet50 model [24], with testset accu-
racy of 93.91% and 76.13% (top-1 accuracy) for CIFAR10
and ImageNet, respectively. All the attacks were performed on
100 images for ImageNet and 1000 for CIFAR-10 taken from
the validation set. Selected images were originally correctly
classified by the model.
Each image evaluation involved a different number of ad-
versarial scratches whose pixel values were optimized with
the CMA-ES algorithm. The algorithm was initialized with
parameters µ = 0 and σ= 0.5, and a population size λ = 40,
chosen after hyperparameter tuning (described in Section 5.2).
For CIFAR-10 and ImageNet attacks, the maximum number
of iterations were set to 40 and 400, respectively, for a total
of 16,000 and 160,000 maximum queries, respectively.
All network-domain attacks were targeted. Targets were
chosen at random and were fixed for each source image to
make fair comparisons between attacks on the same image
with different numbers of scratches. To reduce the effects
of lucky initialization of the location of the scratches, each
image was attacked 10 times with different random scratches
locations chosen each time.
5 Results
We evaluated our scratches on the ResNet-50 and VGG-16
neural networks trained on CIFAR-10 and pre-trained Ima-
geNet ResNet-50 and AlexNet networks. For each dataset, we
evaluated both image-domain and network-domain attacks
across different types and numbers of scratches.
5.1 Image Domain
Straight Lines. We first applied adversarial scratches in the
form of a straight line, with several examples being demon-
strated in Figure 3. Table 1 reports the CIFAR-10 attack
success rates. We note that straight line image-domain at-
tacks were less successful on ImageNet, with 2−straight line
scratches achieving a 60% success rate.
Bézier Curves. Image-domain attacks demonstrated a high
success rate across targeted attacks in CIFAR-10 and untar-
geted attacks in ImageNet, across Bézier curve and straight
line shapes, and across varying numbers of scratches. We ob-
serve in Table 1 that more scratches resulted in higher attack
success rates, queries were largely independent of the number
of scratches, and Bézier-curve-based attacks were more suc-
cessful than straight-line-based attacks. For ImageNet-based
models, we achieved a 70% success rate for 2-Bézier curve
attacks with a population size of 500 evaluated over 100 itera-
tions, and 30% success rate for 2 straight lines with the same
population and iterations. We observed that image-domain
attacks were significantly harder to achieve than network-
domain attacks, notably because of the extremely small search
space both in terms of dimensionality and the constraints on
the upper and lower bounds of the search space. Nevertheless,
our experiments show a clear vulnerability in neural-network-
based classifiers to this class of attacks. Further details can be
found in Table 1.
Comparing to Existing Attacks. We compare our Bézier-
curve attack to the one-pixel attack [46], which is the most
similar attack. The one-pixel attack uses differential evolution
to find single pixels that can fool classifiers. For CIFAR-10,
we trained a VGG-16 model to a test-accuracy of 85.77%,
and compared our single-scratch, image-domain Bézier curve
attack to theirs. We obtained an attack success rate of 75.79%
for a query limit of 2500 compared to their attack success rate
of 5.63% with a query limit of 20,000. Table 3 highlights fur-
ther dependence on attack cost. For ImageNet-based models,
we attacked the AlexNet model and were able to successfully
fool 100% of all images under 50,000 queries, while the one-
pixel attack achieves a success rate of 16.04% with the same
query limit.
Population Size Tuning. To choose an appropriate popula-
tion size that optimizes for attack success rate as well as
latency, we varied the population size and found that a popu-
lation of 50 offered the best performance.
Physical Attack. We attempted to attack the Microsoft Cogni-
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Figure 5: Variable location, double scratch attacks on ImageNet in the image domain. The top row contains the original images
and their respective class label. The bottom row images are adversarial samples generated via our double-scratch attack and the
predicted class when evaluated on ResNet-50 [24].
Image Domain
Bézier Curves Straight Lines
Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage
1 66.25% 711 4.13% 1 61.1% 456 2.64%
2 86.5% 1140 5.95% 2 75.39% 581 4.96%
3 92.06% 899 7.48% 3 83.33% 490 6.82%
Table 1: Variable-location image-domain scratch attack results for ResNet-50 trained on CIFAR-10. More scratch coverage
resulted in higher success rates, with Bézier curves offering a better attack success rate than straight lines.
Image Domain
Bezier Curves Straight Line
Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage
2 70% 30472 0.7% 2 33% 32198 0.56%
3 73% 21988 1.3% 3 42% 25499 0.9%
Table 2: Variable-location image-domain scratch attack results for ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet. More scratch coverage
resulted in higher success rates, with Bézier curves offering a better attack success rate than straight lines. ImageNet requires
significantly more queries than CIFAR-10 attacks.
Single Scratch attack One pixelattack
Query Limit 2500 10000 20000 20000
Success
Rate 75.79% 83.7% 84.7% 5.63%
Pixel
Coverage 3.78% 3.77% 3.68% 0.1%
Table 3: Our attack compared to one-pixel attack [46] for
VGG-16 trained on CIFAR-10.
tive Services Image Captioning API [32] using our proposed
methods. The service provides a descriptive caption of the
image as well as its confidence. Our goal was to utilize the
confidence as our fitness function and attempt to minimize the
confidence to make the API generate fake or missing captions.
In this setting, we used 3 scratches, with 50 iterations and a
population size of 50, with an upper limit of 2500 queries to
the API.
We successfully managed to decrease the caption confi-
dence from an initial value of 0.87 down to 0.25, and were
able to deceive the API into generating wrong captions. In
8
one particular case, the API was not able to generate any cap-
tions at all. Several examples of these generated scratches are
shown in Table 4.
5.2 Fixed-Location Network Domain
Population Size Tuning. To choose a good value for the
population size, we performed attacks on a set of 24 images
from CIFAR-10, each time picking a population size from
[5,10,20,40,80,150]. We set the population size as 40, which
we observed to give the fewest average number of queries to
perform a successful attack (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Impact of population size on the average number of
queries needed by fixed-location network-domain attacks on
CIFAR-10.
Straight lines attacks. Figure 7 shows a few examples of
adversarial straight line scratches; Tables 5 and 6 show the
results from 100 attacked images. We report the average per-
centage of pixels covered by successful attacks, the average
number of queries of successful attacks, and the success rates.
It is evident, particularly in ImageNet results, that using more
scratches leads to a lower average number of queries and a
higher success rate.
Bézier curves attacks. We changed the shape of the adver-
sarial scratches, this times using quadratic Bézier curves, as
explained in Section 3.3. Results are reported in Tables 5 and
6, respectively. We can see again that increasing the number
of scratches decreases the number of queries of a successful
attack and increases its success rate. Moreover, we can ob-
serve that Bézier curves attacks are more effective than the
corresponding straight lines attacks, in terms of the number
of queries needed and the success rate. Our intuition is that
the attacked model uses more information on the shape of the
image rather than its colors when making a prediction; hence,
a nonlinear scratch like a Bézier curve can better exploit this
behavior. This may also explain why a higher number of
scratches results in a higher-success rate: scratches located in
different parts of an image can exploit more shape-dependent
features.
Original Image
Castle
Adversarial Image
Honeycomb
dugong, Dugong dugon Shopping cart
Figure 7: Examples of CMA-ES straight lines attacks in the
network domain. Scratches were clipped to the image domain
for visualization purposes. The left side shows the original
images and their corresponding class; the right side shows the
generated adversarial samples (scratches) and their respective
predicted labels when evaluated on ResNet-50. Best viewed
in color.
5.3 Variable Location Network Domain
Network-domain attacks with variable locations achieve lower
success rates than their image-domain counterparts, as illus-
trated in Table 7. We hypothesize that this may be due to
searching over a much larger search space when taking into
account the relaxation on the pixel value restrictions. Further-
more, we observe that the majority of variable-location attacks
on ImageNet time out with our query budget, motivating the
need for a much larger query budget for such attacks.
6 Discussion
6.1 Unsuccessful Image-Domain Scratch At-
tempts
Prior to obtaining our results, we experimented with a broad
range of parameters for the scratches. For the image domain,
we attempted the following:
• CMA-ES. We initially used CMA-ES with fixed scratch
locations and tanh normalization to implement image-
domain attacks similar to the CW attack [11]. However,
this yielded an attack success of around 2%, which mo-
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Input
Image
Predicted
Caption
A large passenger jet flying
through a cloudy blue sky
A flock of birds flying in the
sky
A group of people flying kites
in the sky
Confidence 0.870 0.438 0.406
Input
Image
Predicted
Caption
A flock of seagulls flying in
the sky
A airplane that is flying in the
sky No caption
Confidence 0.317 0.250 —
Table 4: Successful attacks against the Microsoft Cognitive Services Image Captioning API. The top left image denotes the
source image, which is captioned correctly as ‘a large passenger jet flying through a cloudy blue sky’. All other images are
examples of images that successfully deceived the captioning service. Best viewed in color.
Network Domain
Bézier Curves Straight Lines
Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage
1 53.80% 31718 0.46% 1 44.00% 34623 0.56%
2 86.40% 25747 0.84% 2 80.50% 30776 0.99%
3 96.70% 16838 1.24% 3 92.40% 23826 1.42%
4 98.77% 11640 1.65% 4 96.40% 18848 1.86%
Table 5: Network domain, fixed-location scratch attack success rate for ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet.
tivated us to use Differential Evolution, which signifi-
cantly improved attack success rate.
• Fixed scratch location. We initially attempted our
image-domain attacks with fixed scratch parameters and
evolved only the RGB values. This led to our fitness
functions often getting stuck in local minima and not
converging to the target class; hence, we included the
scratch location parameters in the evolution strategy.
6.2 Source-target Dependency in Network Do-
main
We wanted to analyze whether there was a relationship be-
tween the ground truth and the target class with respect to the
difficulty of the attack. For practical reasons, we performed
the following experiments on CIFAR-10, given that it has
only 10 classes compared to ImageNet with 1000 classes. The
results in Figure 9 are based on 500 attacked images with 50
samples per target class. In this figure, rows correspond to
source classes, columns correspond to target classes, and cell
values correspond to the average number of queries needed
to achieve a successful attack.
The mean value for each row, displayed in the right-most
column in Figure 9, provides the average number of queries
needed to perform a successful attack for images with that par-
ticular source class. We observe that not all source classes are
equally easy to attack; the deer class is the easiest to attack,
while the car and truck classes are the hardest. Conversely,
the mean values for each column, displayed in the bottom row
of Figure 9, provide the average number of queries required
to generate a successful adversarial sample with that class as
the target. We observe that not all classes are easy to reach as
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Network Domain
Bézier Curves Straight Lines
Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage
1 77.80% 2697 2.97% 1 54.90% 3133 3.28%
2 93.10% 2089 4.21% 2 76.80% 3207 3.96%
3 96.00% 2000 4.54% 3 83.80% 2829 4.30%
4 97.20% 1915 4.69% 4 90.70% 2622 4.40%
Table 6: Network domain, fixed-location scratch attack success rate for ResNet-50 trained on CIFAR-10.
Network Domain
Bézier Curves Straight Lines
Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage Scratches Success Rate Queries Coverage
1 52.18% 1578 4.15% 1 63.49% 350 1.98%
2 68.25% 886 6.57% 2 68.45% 410 3.94%
3 75.77% 940 8.62% 3 72.22% 1340 5.1%
Table 7: Network domain, variable-location scratch attack success rate for ResNet-50 trained on CIFAR-10. We use differential
evolution with relaxed constraints on the pixel values.
targets; the ship and deer classes require the most queries
when chosen as targets.
Furthermore, we attempted to investigate the semantic sim-
ilarity between source and target classes. We computed word
similarity measures using the WordNet dataset [33], with the
results highlighted in Figure 10. Given the results in Figure 9,
we conjecture that higher similarity between the source and
target labels typically results in a more effective attack. For
example, for the (truck, car) pair, we need relatively fewer
queries to generate targeted attacks towards car classes from
a truck image, and vice versa. This phenomena persists for
other pairs with similar semantic information, such as (cat,
dog) or (bird,plane).
However, we believe that this query dependency is tightly
connected with the method used to compute class similarity;
for instance, while bird and plane classes share similarity
in that they represent flying objects, that is not the case for
pairs such as (truck, car) and (dog, cat), as illustrated in
Figure 10. One possible conjecture might be that although
semantic similarity between classes plays a major role in
the ease of an attack, simple tree-based structures such as
WordNet are not sufficient. Further work is needed to devise
suitable semantic similarity metrics between source and target
classes.
6.3 Defenses in Image Domain
Image Filtering. We discuss several possible image filter
solutions to prevent image domain adversarial-scratch attacks.
We evaluated the following techniques as defenses against
adversarial scratched images in the image domain:
• JPEG compression with varying quality factors
• Median filters applied to each channel separately with a
kernel size of 3×3 pixels
We capture this behavior through the recovery rate, defined
as the fraction of adversarial images that are predicted accord-
ing to their correct labels after an adversarial scratches attack.
Surprisingly, we find that JPEG compression is highly inef-
fective as a defense against image-domain scratches targeting
ImageNet-trained ResNet-50 models. We observe that we
recovered 0% of original labels from adversarially scratched
images. Correspondingly, JPEG compression also leads to a
low recovery rate for CIFAR-10 trained ResNet-50 models.
Median filtering offers a better recovery rate, as highlighted
in Table 8. We observe visually in Figure 11 that median
filtering can physically remove scratch pixels from the image,
while JPEG compression often fails to do so, which might
explain median filtering’s effectiveness as a defense.
Method ImageNetRecovery Rate
CIFAR-10
Recovery Rate
JPEG, q=85 0% 30.4%
JPEG, q=90 0% 36.58%
JPEG, q=95 0% 34.14%
JPEG, q=99 0% 24.3%
Median filter 100% 47.56%
Table 8: Recovery rate for ImageNet-trained ResNet-50
against double scratch Bézier curve attacks.
Certified Defenses. Furthermore, we evaluated the image-
domain attack against certified defenses for adversarial
patches [15], which provides a certificate of robustness, or an
upper bound on the attack success rate for a given test set and
L0-based threat model, which is most suited for our attack. We
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Original Image
Spoonbill
Adversarial Image
Digital clock
Porcupine, hedgehog Church, church building
Figure 8: Examples of CMA-ES Bézier curves attacks in the
network domain. Scratches were clipped to the image domain
for visualization purposes. The left side shows the original
images and their corresponding class; the right side shows the
generated adversarial samples (scratches) and their respective
predicted labels when evaluated on ResNet-50. Best viewed
in color.
plane car bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck Row mean
plane
car
bird
cat
deer
dog
frog
horse
ship
truck
Column
mean
   0 1879 1456 3003 3886 3144 2947 3478 3157 3039     2887
3407    0 4227 4631 6393 5560 3782 5370 3502 2462     4370
 889 2322    0 1587 1543 1043 1764 2324 4607 3929     2223
2385 2505 1099    0 1820 1169 1835 2187 3677 2642     2146
1267 1480  792  951    0  877 2007 1583 3183 2325     1607
2465 2359 1760  677 2032    0 2384 2188 4605 3331     2422
2100 2083  929 1151 2169 1619    0 3163 5568 3499     2475
2319 2584 2655 1694 2942 1401 3659    0 5701 3051     2889
 704 1119 1776 2691 3574 2432 2070 3660    0 2145     2241
2505 1400 4677 4579 5600 5421 5888 5033 4000    0     4344
                                                
2004 1970 2152 2329 3328 2518 2926 3220 4222 2935         
Figure 9: Source-target dependency on CIFAR-10. Cell values
correspond to the average number of queries to attack a source
class (row) with a target class (column). The figure also shows
the means of each row and column.
did not evaluate our attack against L∞ or L2 certified defenses
as they lie outside our threat model. We trained a Convolu-
tional Neural Network (CNN) from Chiang et al. [15] with
four convolutional layers with kernel size (3, 4, 3, 4), stride (1,
2, 1, 2), output channels (4, 4, 8 ,8), and two fully connected
layers with 256 neurons on CIFAR-10. It achieved a test ac-
curacy of 36.9% and a certified accuracy of 21.90% for L0
attacks that lie within a 5×5 pixel patch.
plane car bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
plane
car
bird
cat
deer
dog
frog
horse
ship
truck
1.000 0.111 0.067 0.053 0.050 0.071 0.062 0.050 0.167 0.111
0.111 1.000 0.071 0.056 0.053 0.077 0.067 0.053 0.125 0.333
0.067 0.071 1.000 0.143 0.125 0.167 0.250 0.125 0.071 0.071
0.053 0.056 0.143 1.000 0.125 0.200 0.125 0.125 0.056 0.056
0.050 0.053 0.125 0.125 1.000 0.125 0.111 0.143 0.053 0.053
0.071 0.077 0.167 0.200 0.125 1.000 0.143 0.125 0.077 0.077
0.062 0.067 0.250 0.125 0.111 0.143 1.000 0.111 0.067 0.067
0.050 0.053 0.125 0.125 0.143 0.125 0.111 1.000 0.053 0.053
0.167 0.125 0.071 0.056 0.053 0.077 0.067 0.053 1.000 0.125
0.111 0.333 0.071 0.056 0.053 0.077 0.067 0.053 0.125 1.000
Figure 10: Similarity of CIFAR-10 classes computed with
WordNet.
Original Image Adversarial Image
Adversarial Image
JPEG compressed
Adversarial Image
Median Filtered
Figure 11: Best viewed in color. Filtering methods to counter
adversarial noise. We visualize the results of various image
compression mechanisms, namely JPEG compression and me-
dian filtering. JPEG compression fails to remove the scratches
in an image, which might be responsible for its ineffectiveness
as a defense. Median filtering on the other hand allows for
much better smoothing and removal of the scratches.
Our attack on this network achieves a 2.2% success rate for
1000 CIFAR-10 images when taking into account the threat
model of adversarial scratches falling within a 5× 5 patch,
and 34% when we remove this restriction. We find certified
defenses to be a suitable defense against our attack. However,
they are computationally intensive and currently cannot be
scaled to larger neural networks such as those trained on
ImageNet. Training certifiably robust neural networks for
larger architectures remains an open problem.
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6.4 Defenses in Network Domain
Here we discuss possible solutions to prevent the proposed
attacks in the network domain. We evaluated the following
techniques as defenses against adversarial scratched images:
• Clipping to the range [0, 1]; i.e., clip each pixel of the
given image so that they fall into the image domain
• JPEG compression with varying quality factors
• Median filter applied to each channel separately with a
kernel size of 3x3 pixels
To assess their performance, we use the notion of recovery
rate defined in Section 6.3. Interestingly, we found out that
about 21% of the attacks on CIFAR-10, even if we are in
the network domain, fall in the image domain. All attacks
on ImageNet fall outside the image domain. Tables 9 and
10 show the recovery rate with respect to all the available
adversarial attacks. Table 9 also shows the recovery rate after
splitting the attacks into the ones that are in the network
domain and the ones that fall in the image domain to evaluate
the performance of the defenses on each domain separately.
Method RecoveryRate
Network
Domain
Image
Domain
Clipping 53% 70% 0%
JPEG, quality = 90 77% 86% 47%
JPEG, quality = 95 80% 90% 49%
JPEG, quality = 99 82% 91% 51%
Median filter 86% 88% 81%
Table 9: Performance of defense methods applied to network-
domain fixed-location attacks on CIFAR-10. We highlight
the recovery rates after performing image filtering on image
domain scratches obtained from network domain attacks.
Method Recovery Rate
Clipping 66%
JPEG, quality = 85 81%
JPEG, quality = 90 79%
JPEG, quality = 95 76%
JPEG, quality = 99 76%
Median filter 78%
Table 10: Performance of defense methods applied to network-
domain fixed-location attacks on ImageNet.
Tables 11 and 12 show the performance impacts after ap-
plying the defense methods over the testset.
Considering both the effectiveness of the defense and the
drop in model performance on benign images, JPEG compres-
sion appears to be the best defense in the network domain,
Method Accuracy Drop
No defense method 93.91% —
Clipping 93.91% 0.00%
JPEG, quality = 99 93.72% 0.19%
Median filter 80.00% 13.91%
Table 11: Drop of ResNet-50 model performance after apply-
ing defense methods on CIFAR-10 testset.
Method Accuracy Drop
No defense method 76.13% —
Clipping 76.13% 0.00%
JPEG, quality = 85 74.55% 1.58%
Median filter 71.97% 4.16%
Table 12: Drop of ResNet-50 model performance after apply-
ing defense methods on ImageNet testset.
due to its low impact on model performance and highest pre-
vention rate, while median filtering appears to be the best
defense for image domain attacks.
We can appreciate that the majority of image-domain at-
tacks need fewer than 400 queries, corresponding to at most
10 iterations of the CMA-ES algorithm with a population size
of 40, as described in Section 4.2.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed adversarial scratches, a new attack
against neural networks inspired by the scratches that are
commonly found in old printed photographs.
Our attack operates under strict assumptions: adversaries
have access only to the predictions of a model (i.e, black-box
access) and have limited ability in altering the input data.
Our attack proved to be effective against not only several
state-of-the-art deep neural network image classifiers, but
also Microsoft’s Cognitive Services Image Captioning API.
To offer a complete perspective, we also proposed mitigation
strategies against our attack and demonstrated that we have
the ability to restore the performance of the attacked models.
As future work, we aim to gain a better understanding
of the correlation between source-target classes, their poten-
tial semantic similarities, and the success of the adversarial
scratches attack. Furthermore, building upon the preliminary
results obtained in this paper, we intend to expand our inves-
tigation on potential mitigation strategies. Additionally, we
will expand our attack beyond the image classification. For
instance, the equivalent of adversarial scratches for speech
recognition systems can be posed as chirped sequences that
appear benign, but might potentially be malicious.
13
References
[1] Shadi Albarqouni, Christoph Baur, Felix Achilles,
Vasileios Belagiannis, Stefanie Demirci, and Nassir
Navab. Aggnet: Deep learning from crowds for mitosis
detection in breast cancer histology images. IEEE Trans-
actions on Medical Imaging, 35(5):1313–1321, 2016.
[2] Moustafa Alzantot, Yash Sharma, Supriyo Chakraborty,
and Mani Srivastava. GenAttack: Practical black-box
attacks with gradient-free optimization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1805.11090, 2018.
[3] Moustafa Alzantot, Yash Sharma, Ahmed Elgohary, Bo-
Jhang Ho, Mani Srivastava, and Kai-Wei Chang. Gen-
erating natural language adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1804.07998, 2018.
[4] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Ob-
fuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circum-
venting defenses to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
[5] Anish Athalye, Logan Engstrom, Andrew Ilyas, and
Kevin Kwok. Synthesizing robust adversarial exam-
ples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
[6] Trapit Bansal, Jakub Pachocki, Szymon Sidor, Ilya
Sutskever, and Igor Mordatch. Emergent complex-
ity via multi-agent competition. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.03748, 2017.
[7] Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Warren He, Bo Li, and Dawn Song.
Exploring the space of black-box attacks on deep neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.09491, 2017.
[8] Battista Biggio, Blaine Nelson, and Pavel Laskov. Poi-
soning attacks against support vector machines. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1206.6389, 2012.
[9] Tom B Brown, Dandelion Mané, Aurko Roy, Martín
Abadi, and Justin Gilmer. Adversarial patch. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.09665, 2017.
[10] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Adversarial ex-
amples are not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection
methods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop on
Artificial Intelligence and Security, pages 3–14. ACM,
2017.
[11] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Towards evaluat-
ing the robustness of neural networks. In 2017 IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57.
IEEE, 2017.
[12] Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. Audio adversarial
examples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text. In 2018
IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages
1–7. IEEE, 2018.
[13] Pin-Yu Chen, Yash Sharma, Huan Zhang, Jinfeng Yi, and
Cho-Jui Hsieh. EAD: elastic-net attacks to deep neural
networks via adversarial examples. In Thirty-second
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2018.
[14] Pin-Yu Chen, Huan Zhang, Yash Sharma, Jinfeng Yi,
and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Zoo: Zeroth order optimization
based black-box attacks to deep neural networks without
training substitute models. In Proceedings of the 10th
ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security,
pages 15–26. ACM, 2017.
[15] Ping-yeh Chiang, Renkun Ni, Ahmed Abdelkader, Chen
Zhu, Christoph Studor, and Tom Goldstein. Certi-
fied defenses for adversarial patches. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2003.06693, 2020.
[16] Jacob Devlin, Ming-Wei Chang, Kenton Lee, and
Kristina Toutanova. Bert: Pre-training of deep bidirec-
tional transformers for language understanding. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1810.04805, 2018.
[17] Sergey Edunov, Myle Ott, Michael Auli, and David
Grangier. Understanding back-translation at scale. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1808.09381, 2018.
[18] Gerald Farin, Josef Hoschek, and M-S Kim. Handbook
of computer aided geometric design. Elsevier, 2002.
[19] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian
Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial exam-
ples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[20] Chuan Guo, Jared S Frank, and Kilian Q Weinberger.
Low frequency adversarial perturbation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1809.08758, 2018.
[21] Chuan Guo, Jacob R Gardner, Yurong You, Andrew Gor-
don Wilson, and Kilian Q Weinberger. Simple black-box
adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.07121,
2019.
[22] Awni Hannun, Carl Case, Jared Casper, Bryan Catan-
zaro, Greg Diamos, Erich Elsen, Ryan Prenger, Sanjeev
Satheesh, Shubho Sengupta, Adam Coates, et al. Deep
speech: Scaling up end-to-end speech recognition. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.5567, 2014.
[23] Nikolaus Hansen. The CMA evolution strategy: A tuto-
rial. arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.00772, 2016.
[24] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian
Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition. In
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vi-
sion and Pattern Recognition, pages 770–778, 2016.
14
[25] Gao Huang, Zhuang Liu, Laurens Van Der Maaten, and
Kilian Q Weinberger. Densely connected convolutional
networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 4700–
4708, 2017.
[26] Andrew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, Anish Athalye, and
Jessy Lin. Black-box adversarial attacks with
limited queries and information. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.08598, 2018.
[27] Danny Karmon, Daniel Zoran, and Yoav Goldberg. La-
van: Localized and visible adversarial noise. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.02608, 2018.
[28] Alex Krizhevsky et al. Learning multiple layers of
features from tiny images. Technical report, Citeseer,
2009.
[29] Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey E Hin-
ton. Imagenet classification with deep convolutional
neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 1097–1105, 2012.
[30] Quan Le, Oisín Boydell, Brian Mac Namee, and Mark
Scanlon. Deep learning at the shallow end: Malware
classification for non-domain experts. Digital Investiga-
tion, 26:S118–S126, 2018.
[31] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig
Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. In
International Conference on Learning Representations,
2018.
[32] Microsoft. Cognitive Services Image Captioning API.
https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/
cognitive-services/computer-vision/, 2020.
[Online; accessed 18-June-2020].
[33] George A Miller. Wordnet: a lexical database for english.
Communications of the ACM, 38(11):39–41, 1995.
[34] Apostolos Modas, Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli,
and Pascal Frossard. Sparsefool: a few pixels make a big
difference. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 9087–
9096, 2019.
[35] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and
Pascal Frossard. DeepFool: a simple and accurate
method to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of
the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 2574–2582, 2016.
[36] Nina Narodytska and Shiva Kasiviswanathan. Sim-
ple black-box adversarial attacks on deep neural net-
works. In 2017 IEEE Conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW), pages
1310–1318. IEEE, 2017.
[37] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt
Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. The
limitations of deep learning in adversarial settings. In
2016 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy (EuroS&P), pages 372–387. IEEE, 2016.
[38] Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan,
Dario Amodei, and Ilya Sutskever. Language models are
unsupervised multitask learners. OpenAI Blog, 1(8):9,
2019.
[39] Edward Raff, Jon Barker, Jared Sylvester, Robert Bran-
don, Bryan Catanzaro, and Charles K Nicholas. Mal-
ware detection by eating a whole exe. In Workshops at
the Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelli-
gence, 2018.
[40] Yash Sharma and Pin-Yu Chen. Attacking the madry de-
fense model with l_1-based adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1710.10733, 2017.
[41] Wei Shen, Mu Zhou, Feng Yang, Caiyun Yang, and Jie
Tian. Multi-scale convolutional neural networks for
lung nodule classification. In International Conference
on Information Processing in Medical Imaging, pages
588–599. Springer, 2015.
[42] Ilia Shumailov, Yiren Zhao, Daniel Bates, Nicholas Pa-
pernot, Robert Mullins, and Ross Anderson. Sponge
examples: Energy-latency attacks on neural networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.03463, 2020.
[43] David Silver, Aja Huang, Chris J Maddison, Arthur
Guez, Laurent Sifre, George Van Den Driessche, Ju-
lian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Veda Panneer-
shelvam, Marc Lanctot, et al. Mastering the game of
go with deep neural networks and tree search. Nature,
529(7587):484, 2016.
[44] David Silver, Thomas Hubert, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioan-
nis Antonoglou, Matthew Lai, Arthur Guez, Marc Lanc-
tot, Laurent Sifre, Dharshan Kumaran, Thore Graepel,
et al. Mastering chess and shogi by self-play with a gen-
eral reinforcement learning algorithm. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1712.01815, 2017.
[45] Karen Simonyan and Andrew Zisserman. Very deep con-
volutional networks for large-scale image recognition.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1409.1556, 2014.
[46] Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas, and Kouichi
Sakurai. One pixel attack for fooling deep neural net-
works. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computa-
tion, 2019.
15
[47] Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jon
Shlens, and Zbigniew Wojna. Rethinking the inception
architecture for computer vision. In Proceedings of
the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 2818–2826, 2016.
[48] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever,
Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and Rob
Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[49] R Vinayakumar, Mamoun Alazab, KP Soman, Praba-
haran Poornachandran, and Sitalakshmi Venkatraman.
Robust intelligent malware detection using deep learn-
ing. IEEE Access, 7:46717–46738, 2019.
[50] Oriol Vinyals, Igor Babuschkin, Wojciech M Czarnecki,
Michaël Mathieu, Andrew Dudzik, Junyoung Chung,
David H Choi, Richard Powell, Timo Ewalds, Petko
Georgiev, et al. Grandmaster level in StarCraft II using
multi-agent reinforcement learning. Nature, pages 1–5,
2019.
[51] Chenglin Yang, Adam Kortylewski, Cihang Xie, Yinzhi
Cao, and Alan Yuille. Patchattack: A black-box texture-
based attack with reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2004.05682, 2020.
[52] Alois Zingl. A rasterizing algorithm for drawing curves.
2012.
16
